The State of the Art in Cryptocurrencies by Le, Yasmin
Junior Management Science 2(3) (2017) 1-10
Junior Management Science
journal homepage: www.jums.academy
Advisory Editorial Board:
DOMINIK VAN AAKEN
FREDERIK AHLEMANN
CHRISTOPH BODE
ROLF BRÜHL
JOACHIM BÜSCHKEN
LEONHARD DOBUSCH
RALF ELSAS
DAVID FLORYSIAK
GUNTHER FRIEDL
WOLFGANG GÜTTEL
CHRISTIAN HOFMANN
KATJA HUTTER
LUTZ JOHANNING
STEPHAN KAISER
ALFRED KIESER
NATALIA KLIEWER
DODO ZU KNYPHAUSEN-AUFSEß
SABINE T. KÖSZEGI
ARJAN KOZICA
TOBIAS KRETSCHMER
HANS-ULRICH KÜPPER
REINER LEIDL
ANTON MEYER
GORDON MÜLLER-SEITZ
GÜNTER MÜLLER-STEWENS
BURKHARD PEDELL
MARCEL PROKOPCZUK
TANJA RABL
SASCHA RAITHEL
ASTRID REICHEL
KATJA ROST
MARKO SARSTEDT
DEBORAH SCHANZ
ANDREAS G. SCHERER
STEFAN SCHMID
UTE SCHMIEL
CHRISTIAN SCHMITZ
PHILIPP SCHRECK
GEORG SCHREYÖGG
LARS SCHWEIZER
DAVID SEIDL
THORSTEN SELLHORN
ANDREAS SUCHANEK
ORESTIS TERZIDIS
ANJA TUSCHKE
SABINE URNIK
STEPHAN WAGNER
BARBARA E. WEIßENBERGER
ISABELL M. WELPE
HANNES WINNER
CLAUDIA B. WÖHLE
THOMAS WRONA
THOMAS ZWICK
Volume 2, Issue 3, December 2017
JUNIOR
MANAGEMENT
SCIENCE
Yasmin Le, The State of the Art in Cryptocurrencies
Fabian Müller, Einfluss von Commitment und Affekten 
auf das Investitionsverhalten in Projekten
Marcus Pfeiffer, Biases bei betriebswirtschaftlichen 
Entscheidungen in Großprojekten und 
Lösungsansätze: Aktueller Stand der Theorie 
und Empirie
Simon Hux, Ankereffekt und Risikoprämie anhand einer 
Crowdfunding-Kampagne
Anastasia Kieliszek, Corporate Divestment Decision 
Factors: A Systematic Review
Kevin Rudolph, Analyzing Dynamic Capabilities in the 
Context of Cloud Platform Ecosystems - A Case 
Study Approach
1
11
48
73
104
124
Published by Junior Management Science e. V. 
The State of the Art in Cryptocurrencies
Yasmin Le
Universität Mannheim
Abstract
Bitcoin has emerged as a popular digital currency and arouses the interest not only of programmers, but also of investors and
academics. What interests them most is its underlying technology, the blockchain. This thesis aims at giving an overview of the
current state of cryptocurrencies and compares their different designs and approaches to Bitcoin. The blockchain technology
will be explained, as well as how it could impact many aspects in life by showcasing different applications of Ethereum
blockchain-based smart contracts. Based on the evaluation of the different cryptocurrencies and preceding conclusions, specific
cryptocurrencies will be applied to the Tasklet system before proposing the implementation of the blockchain technology in
such a system, in order to establish a reward system.
The paper reviews a heterogeneous, scattered body of knowledge including academic literature, but also non-scientific
sources due to the constantly evolving technology. On this basis, the advantages of Bitcoin, but also its weaknesses, as well as
the vast potential of blockchain are discussed. Results indicate that although Bitcoin’s framework may be limited, it will still
play an important role in the future due to its dominance in the cryptocurrency market. The short display of blockchain-fueled
applications and its effects has shown its potential to transform the internet, leading to the rise of the Web 3.0.
Keywords: Bitcoin, Blockchain, Cryptocurrency, Distributed Ledger Technology, Smart Contract
1. Introduction
Already in the 1980’s, the idea of cryptocurrencies ex-
isted when the first proposal for “untraceable payments” was
made by Chaum in 1983 (Chaum (1983)). Since then, many
ongoing improvements and extensions have been suggested.
However, these early attempts lack proper security mech-
anisms against cyberattacks and still require a central au-
thority as a controlling instance. With the introduction of
Bitcoin in 2009, these difficulties were finally overcome, as
it provides a decentralized network for secure transactions
(Tschorsch and Scheuermann (2016)). Bitcoin has emerged
as a popular digital currency and arouses the interest not
only of programmers, but also of investors and academics.
What interests them most is its underlying technology, the
blockchain.
Blockchain enables a distributed peer-to-peer network
where no trusted party is required anymore. Based on this
technology, many alternative currencies have emerged, aim-
ing to solve some of Bitcoin’s weaknesses (Bonneau et al.
(2015)). However, blockchain’s impact goes far beyond
currency. It allows for self-enforcing contracts, so-called
smart contracts, automating complex multi-step processes
(Christidis and Devetsikiotis (2016)). These contracts are
run by networks like Ethereum and enable various applica-
tions in many areas. The potential of blockchain will drive
innovation, leading to more efficiency and democracy in ex-
isting systems and organizations (?). Since the technology
surrounding cryptocurrencies and blockchain is constantly
evolving, this paper also relies on wikis, forums, blogs and
other non-scientific sources.
1.1. Objective of the Thesis
This thesis aims at giving an overview of the current state
of cryptocurrencies and compares their different designs and
approaches to Bitcoin. Given Bitcoin’s prominence, the paper
will pay special attention to Bitcoin and evaluate its design
with focus on its underlying technology, the blockchain. In
order to demonstrate the scope of the technology and how
it could impact many aspects in life, different applications
of Ethereum blockchain-based smart contracts will be show-
cased. Based on the evaluation of the different cryptocurren-
cies and preceding conclusions, specific cryptocurrencies will
be applied to the Tasklet system in order to propose the most
suitable one for supporting a payment system in this real use
case.
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1.2. Structure of the Thesis
The paper is organized as follows. First, key concepts
of cryptocurrencies are outlined and Bitcoin is introduced.
Chapter 3 examines Bitcoin’s protocol and structure. Techni-
cal challenges and limitations of Bitcoin are also addressed,
for which solution approaches in the form of alternative cryp-
tocurrencies will be reviewed in Chapter 4. The implications
of having blockchain as a basis technology and its vast poten-
tial are discussed, before proposing, in Chapter 5, its imple-
mentation in a Tasklet system to establish a reward system.
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes this thesis with a brief summary
and outlook for future development.
2. Theoretical Foundations
This chapter introduces important terms and key con-
cepts which lay the technical foundations for cryptocurren-
cies. A brief introduction to Bitcoin will be given and, in a
second part, its underlying technology, cryptography, will be
explained.
2.1. Bitcoin
In 2008, the anonymous group or person, Satoshi Nakamoto,
introduced the cryptocurrency Bitcoin in (Nakamoto (2008)).
However, the idea of a digital currency dates back to the
1980’s. Unlike Bitcoin, all these early attempts required a
central authority (Tschorsch and Scheuermann (2016)). In
later stages, the proof-of-work (POW) puzzles were proposed
to fulfill the function of money supply independently from
banks. Still, the fundamental problem of double-spending
could not be solved until Bitcoin was designed. Bitcoin uses
already existing encryption algorithms and combines them
in a new way to ensure secure transactions. Its main goal
is to provide a decentralized system without the need of a
third party to regulate transactions. There is no trust require-
ment; instead, Bitcoin relies solely on cryptographic proof.
Thus, Bitcoin is based on a peer-to-peer (P2P) network using
POW (Nakamoto (2008)). The core of the Bitcoin protocol
is the blockchain technology, which serves as a distributed
ledger, collecting all the information on transactions ever
made (Tschorsch and Scheuermann (2016)). This results
in complete transparency, since all transactions are publicly
visible to the network.
2.2. Underlying Technology
Before going more deeply into the Bitcoin protocol, Bit-
coin’s basic concepts will be explained. Bitcoin is based on
cryptography, which might be surprising at first because it is
a currency and not a tool for sending secret codes (Nielsen).
However, Bitcoin aims to ensure the security of transactions,
which can be achieved through a cryptographic protocol. To
understand how cryptocurrencies function, a basic sense of
cryptographic primitives is necessary. Below, hash functions
and public key cryptography will be explained along with ap-
plications in building cryptocurrencies.
2.2.1. Cryptographic Hash Function
A hash function is a mathematical function which can
take any data of arbitrary size as input, called messages. Its
output results in the same value for the same message and
always has a fixed size. Outputs are also called message di-
gests or hash (Silva (2003)). Hash functions are one-way
functions, i.e. by only knowing the output, it is infeasible
to determine the input. Cryptographic hash functions differ
from regular functions in specific properties, of which three
will be further elaborated on.
Properties. To be secure, cryptographic hash functions have
to be defined by three particular properties. First, the func-
tion has to be collision-free. It should be difficult to find two
different messages that produce the same hash value. A col-
lision occurs when two different messages produce the same
hash. The longer the hash, the less probable a collision will
occur, due to the increased number of possible values when
having more bits. Secondly, it has to be hiding. When given
the output of a hash function, it should be difficult to find
out the initial input. An attacker will not be able to deter-
mine the original message by only knowing the hash. Since
different messages almost always produce different outputs,
a file changes if its message digest does (Silva (2003)).
Application. Cryptographic hash functions are used to pro-
vide data integrity and authentication when verifying the in-
tegrity of files or passwords. Bitcoin uses the functions, called
SHA-256, for POW in their mining process. A general illus-
tration of their application (cf. Figure 1) is as follows. Alice
provides Bob with a puzzle and claims to know its answer.
Bob wants to solve it, but also wants to be sure that Alice is
telling the truth. Hence, Alice computes the hash of the so-
lution and tells Bob its hash value. Now, Bob can solve the
puzzle himself. After that, he can compare his solution to
Alice’s by hashing it and checking if it matches Alice’s hash
value.
2.2.2. Public Key Cryptography
Bitcoin uses public key cryptography, in which it applies
asymmetric cryptography and mathematically related pairs
of keys. There are two types of keys: public keys, known to a
wide audience, and private keys, only known by the owner.
This leads to authentication when verifying that the message
was sent by a holder of the paired private key by using the
public key. It also enables encryption, because only by having
the paired private key can the message be decrypted, and
provides security (IBM (2017a)). The most common forms
of application are described hereafter.
Public Key Encryption. Any person can encrypt a message with
the public key, but only the holder of the paired private key
can decrypt the message (cf. Figure 2). Thus, asymmetric key
algorithms are used. The same key cannot be used for both
encryption and decryption. Instead, the keys of each pair are
used to reverse the work done by the other (IBM (2017a)).
Digital Signatures. They basically function as signatures on
paper. This means only one particular can make their signa-
ture, but anyone who sees it can verify the validity of their
identity. For digital signatures, a message is signed with the
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private key of the sender, but anyone who has access to the
matching public key can verify it. To create a digital signa-
ture, the document first has to be distilled into a large num-
ber, the digest code. Then, this code gets encrypted with the
private key resulting in the digital signature, which is bound
to that particular document. Now, if the message changed
slightly, the digest code would also change. Hence, verifica-
tion would fail for any other message, no matter how trivial
the difference to the original message is. When the recipient
receives the message, he has to recompute the digest code for
it. To decrypt the signature, the public key has to be used, re-
sulting in the original digest code. Then the recipient has to
compare the recomputed digest code with the original one.
Only if both match is the message intact and authentic (IBM
(2017b)).
3. Bitcoin Technologies
After having laid the foundation, the Bitcoin protocol
will be described and analyzed as originally introduced in
(Nakamoto (2008)). This chapter presents a basic view
on digital currencies and explains them in more detail
later. Thereby, the characteristics of Bitcoin as well as the
blockchain technology and how this technology enables Bit-
coin to solve several problems will be illustrated. Further-
more, the chapter addresses possible problems and weak-
nesses of Bitcoin regarding the five key issues.
3.1. Blockchain
Often, transactions are regulated by a third party, lead-
ing to transaction costs, since the intermediaries want to be
compensated for their services. For example, Alice wants to
transfer coins to Bob; in order to ensure the validity of the
transaction, the coins must be clearly identifiable (Tschorsch
and Scheuermann (2016)), i.e. every coin receives an unique
number; but these numbers have to be issued from a trusted
source, i.e. a bank; the bank maintains the ledger and up-
dates it continuously. Bitcoins aims to get rid of such a cen-
tralized authority by using the blockchain technology (cf.
Figure 3).
Blockchain builds the core of the Bitcoin protocol. Its
first and also most common application is Bitcoin, for which
it serves as the distributed ledger, including all past trans-
actions chronologically. Thus, the growing list of transac-
tions is constantly updated and made publicly available to all
nodes, together with Bitcoin’s transaction history. Through
blockchain a trusted third party is not required anymore and,
thus, decentralization is established. Not only transparency
can be reached by that, but also anonymity, increasing the
security for other nodes to confirm transactions. Once the
transaction has been verified by all nodes, it is tamper-proof.
This results in high security of transactions (Yli-Huumo et al.
(2016)). However, Bitcoin still faces some challenges.
Double-Spending. Alice could be tempted to redeem some
transaction input in two separate transactions, sent to
two different receivers, Bob and Carol (Bonneau et al.
(2015)). Looking at the transactions separately, Bob and
Carol could verify and accept their transaction, which leaves
the blockchain inconsistent. Bitcoin overcomes double-
spending by demanding that transactions must be made pub-
lic in a P2P network, so that all participants can verify the
transaction validity (Tschorsch and Scheuermann (2016)).
It should be accepted only if the majority agrees on the va-
lidity of a transaction. Then it is collected into a block, while
each of these blocks contains a timestamp and the hash of
the previous block. Hence, a specific order is established,
resulting in the so-called blockchain.
Sybil attacks Another problem arises through Sybil attacks:
Alice sets up multiple entities, making up the majority of
the network, to confirm her transactions; she can then still
double-spend her coins and cheat on the system; both Bob
and Carol would trust the verification of the network and ac-
cept the transaction (Tschorsch and Scheuermann (2016)).
3.2. Mining
To prevent these attacks, Bitcoin uses the POW concept in
its mining process, during which, new transactions are broad-
cast to every node in the network (Nakamoto (2008)). The
miners, the network participants, compete against each other
trying to solve a puzzle, the POW. The first to solve the POW
broadcasts the block in the network, and after its verifica-
tion the block is added to the blockchain. Solving the puzzle
is computationally challenging and requires high computa-
tional power. Therefore, the increasing number of identities,
and thus multiple votes, do not guarantee (seizing) control
over the system (Tschorsch and Scheuermann (2016)) and
the problem of Sybil attacks can be avoided.
Proof-of-Work. The POW requires finding a hash with a value
less than or equal to a specific target value (Tschorsch and
Scheuermann (2016)), which influences the puzzle difficulty.
Due to the randomized character of the puzzle, the share of
computational power (CP) is always equal to the chance of
solving the POW. About every 10 min a new block is verified.
To maintain this, the target value is adjusted every 2,016
blocks (Bonneau et al. (2015)).
Calculating the hash requires high CP, i.e. energy and
money. Hence, it may not be immediately apparent what in-
centivizes miners to compete in this race. Mining not only has
the function of verifying transactions, it also increases the Bit-
coin upply. The first miner to solve a block receives a Bitcoin
reward of a certain amount, which is currently 12.5 Bitcoins
(BTC) for every block. Initially, a block reward of 50 BTC was
given out. Since then, the generation of BTCs is halved every
four years until it is below 10−8 BTC, a satoshi, the minimal
unit of Bitcoin (Tschorsch and Scheuermann (2016)).
Since each block contains a pointer to the prior block,
a linear chain is formed and a total block order is estab-
lished. However, it is possible that temporary forks occur:
by chance, two miners provide two different valid solutions
almost simultaneously for the same block. Then consen-
sus is broken, since miners can choose either fork to work
on. Bitcoin is designed to resolve these forks by always fol-
lowing the longest fork, so that only one chain branch sur-
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vives (Tschorsch and Scheuermann (2016)). Thus, consen-
sus is restored. The longest version is always the consen-
sus blockchain (Bonneau et al. (2015)), which is the one ex-
pected to be most difficult to produce and not the one with
the most blocks. Hence, attempts to create the longest fork
by splitting the chain and then creating many simple blocks
are prevented (Wood (2014)). The orphaned (abandoned)
fork (Tschorsch and Scheuermann (2016)) and all its trans-
actions are considered invalid. All in all, a transaction is only
verified if it is part of a block in the longest fork and it has
six successive block confirmations.
3.3. Transactions
Transactions transfer currency from one user to another
(Bonneau et al. (2015)) and assign ownership rights. The
growing transactions are the only state in Bitcoin. Coins per
se do not exist.
Every transaction needs a virtual wallet with at least
a publicprivate key pair. The public key derives address
(Tschorsch and Scheuermann (2016)) using SHA-256, whereas
the private key proves ownership over certain outputs. Out-
puts and inputs are contained in every transaction. Each
output represents a fraction of the Bitcoin currency and con-
tains a short code snippet. It defines the conditions under
which this transaction output can be redeemed (Bonneau
et al. (2015)). Each input always refers to the previous trans-
action, enabling every transaction along the blockchain to be
tracked. Thus, the user will either arrive at the first Bitcoin
transaction or coinbase transaction. These transactions are
special, as they only include outputs. When arriving at the
first Bitcoin transaction, the genesis block will be reached.
Every block, except for the genesis block, includes a record
of which addresses or scripts will receive the reward. This
record is called a coinbase transaction and responsible for
introducing new currency units into the system. For every
standard transaction, the sum of all inputs must be equal to
or greater than the sum of all outputs. If the input is greater
than the output, the difference has to be included in a trans-
action fee to the miner who was working on the respective
block (Tschorsch and Scheuermann (2016)).
3.4. Challenges and Limitations of Bitcoin
Although Bitcoin offers many benefits, the currency strug-
gles with technical deficiencies and limitations. Applying
Bitcoin can entail major risks and work as a double-edged
sword. Often, Bitcoin is associated with illegal activities. One
prominent example is its role behind the online drug market
Silk Road (Pagliery (2013)). Through anonymity and decen-
tralization Silk Road could operate money laundering, while
hiding actors’ identities. Not only since this incident, but also
because Bitcoin has become more mainstream, institutions
and governments have shown growing concerns regarding
regulating issues, such as taxation. Even users partly crit-
icized Bitcoin for its privacy or security issues. In the fol-
lowing, the paper will discuss five key challenges for Bitcoin:
network capacity, latency, security, wasted resources, and pri-
vacy according to (Yli-Huumo et al. (2016)). The focus will
mainly be on technical aspects.
Network capacity. Bitcoin’s popularity has grown since
its launch in 2009, which can be observed by the con-
stantly growing number of Bitcoin transactions. Within two
years, the number of transactions has more than tripled
(Blockchain.info (2017)) and it is even predicted to rise
again. Bitcoin might face difficulties processing more trans-
actions if it does not improve its network capacity. Compared
to VISA, which can process 2000 transactions per second
(tps), Bitcoin is currently only able to process a max. of 7
tps (Yli-Huumo et al. (2016)). Becoming more popular, its
throughput level has to increase to similar levels. However,
with this improvement new problems arise. Roughly every 10
min a new block with a size of 1 MB is created. Bitcoin’s cur-
rent blockchain size is already 113,530 MB (Blockchain.info)
and with increasing transactions it will grow even further.
Thus, size and bandwidth issues have to be addressed.
Latency. Consensus, ergo a block verification, is designed
to take 10 min for security reasons and to detect double-
spending attacks. But to be “deep” enough in the ledger
so that forks are unlikely to occur anymore, another one to
two hours have to be considered. This delay poses a vul-
nerability of the protocol, since an initially verified transac-
tion might be nullified later, when it becomes part of the
orphaned fork. Latency also impedes Bitcoin in competing
with other payment systems for fast-paced transactions, e.g.
financial trading (Berke (2017)). Therefore, many users pre-
fer zero-confirmation transactions, which can propagate be-
tween users within seconds, but hold a higher risk of double-
spending attacks (Karame et al. (2012)).
Security. The most concerning issue Bitcoin faces is secu-
rity. Exceeding a market value of $2,000 (CoinMarketCap
(2017)), profit-oriented attacks on the system are innumer-
able. Not only double-spending poses a threat, Distributed
Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks and other issues are also
challenging Bitcoin. However, the most prominent problem
are 51%-attacks, attempts to dominate mining power.
Security Incidents. With the increasing value of Bitcoin, the
number of thefts has also increased. This is not a failure of
Bitcoin’s security, but a consequence of its reliance on PKC
for user authentication. The private key is the main authen-
tication element. If it gets stolen or lost, all stored coins are
lost, too. Hence, thefts are owed to insecure storage (Berke
(2017)). Due to the rising difficulty of solving POWs, min-
ers join mining pools, combining their hashing power to ver-
ify transactions and then distribute the reward. Particularly
large pools are targeted by DDoS attacks, attempts to disrupt
online service by overwhelming it with traffic from multiple
sources.
51%-attacks. As more and more CP concentrates in a few
large mining pools, the risk of 51%-attack increases. This
is problematic because the entity controlling the majority of
the power could manipulate the blockchain and solve their
own block of transactions (Bradbury (2013)). And even if a
single pool does not exceed the 50% mark by itself, coalitions
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could. They act like a cartel, releasing or keeping informa-
tion as they please. Miners can establish a private chain
when not broadcasting their blocks. As soon as the public
chain approaches the private chain’s length, the rogue miner
announces his private blocks to catch up. Due to this prop-
agation delay, blockchain forks are intentionally caused to
gain an advantage on winning subsequent blocks. Thus, min-
ers earn a higher revenue than their fair share by letting the
others waste their power mining on the public chain. This
strategy is called selfish mining. Another harming strategy is
temporary block withholding which enables double- spend-
ing. Again, the pre-mined blocks are kept secret and for each
of them the miner includes a self-payment, i.e. the double-
spend transaction, by initiating a transaction referring to the
same coins, which will be considered as valid by the network.
As soon as the trade is completed, the pre-mined block with
the double-spend is broadcast. Thus, market-based central-
ization of mining power in pools creates longer transaction
approval time and facilitates double-spending (Tschorsch
and Scheuermann (2016), Eyal and Sirer (2014)).
High Computational Power. Through Bitcoin’s increasingly
difficult mining process, another issue has emerged: high
energy consumption, which was comparable to Ireland’s to-
tal electricity consumption in 2014. In this process, limiting
factors are the hash rate of hardware and the running cost.
Initially, mining took place on regular computers. However,
as Bitcoin gained prominence, a computation race between
miners has begun, in the effort to increase their hash rate.
Currently, Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASIC) are
used to perform the Bitcoin hash at higher rates while low-
ering the energy necessary (O’Dwyer and Malone (2014)).
Privacy. Although a market place like Silk Road would not be
possible without Bitcoin, privacy was never the main goal of
the protocol. Bitcoin only offers a limited form of unlinkabil-
ity by allowing users to create new addresses (pseudonyms)
at any time. Due to Bitcoin’s transparent nature, it is pos-
sible to trace transactions between addresses and link them
to IP addresses, where the transaction is generated (Bonneau
et al. (2015), Tschorsch and Scheuermann (2016)). Informa-
tion about users can be obtained by the P2P network (Reid
and Harrigan (2013)). Usually, a miner is connected to eight
peers, called the client’s entry nodes, and broadcasts their
addresses to the network. These addresses can be mapped to
an IP address simply by observing the Bitcoin flow (Biryukov
et al. (2014)).
4. Alternatives Cryptocurrencies
This chapter discusses proposed changes to Bitcoin. Dif-
ferent solution approaches towards the preceding problems
will be presented, including alternative digital currencies and
protocols. In doing so, the paper will evaluate and compare
them to Bitcoin. Lastly, it introduces the newly established
altchain Ethereum and demonstrates its potential for various
applications. Closely related to it, the blockchain technology
and its impact beyond Bitcoin will be further elaborated on.
4.1. Modifying Bitcoin
Because changes and extensions to Bitcoin are limited, al-
ternative approaches result in new currencies – so-called alt-
coins. Over 800 cryptocurrencies currently exist, such as Bit-
coin, Litecoin and Dash (CoinMarketCap (2017)). The ma-
jority of these currencies is very similar to Bitcoin in that they
have been created by forking Bitcoin’s protocol and rely on its
main features. However, some currencies have a fully differ-
ent design (Bonneau et al. (2015)). Altcoins were mainly cre-
ated to fix shortcomings of Bitcoin, whereby certain changes
only attract smaller groups while others appeal to a wider
clientele and can be regarded as a real competition to Bit-
coin. Instead of suggesting upgrades for Bitcoin itself, this
section focuses on the two most popular altcoins regarding
market capitalization and largest improvements.
4.1.1. Litecoin
The creation of Litecoin in 2011 was never intended
to replace Bitcoin, but rather to serve as the silver to Bit-
coin’s gold (Xie (2017)). Since then it retained its position
among the top five cryptocurrencies (Gandal and Halaburda
(2014)). Its popularity mainly stems from its faster trans-
action times and mining improvements. Bitcoin sets the
incentive to use powerful specialized hardware in the net-
work, which is costly. Thus, not everyone can participate in
mining. Litecoin wants to allow everyone to access and par-
ticipate in this process. Therefore, a more memory-intensive
mining algorithm was introduced, making it resistant to spe-
cialized hardware mining technologies such as ASIC. Instead
of using Bitcoin’s SHA-256 algorithm, Litecoin is based on
the more memory-intensive Scrypt POW algorithm. With a
faster transaction time, Litecoin is able to process a higher
volume of transactions. Instead of 10 min it needs 2.5 min,
a quarter of the time Bitcoin needs. Thus, Litecoin is able
to supply a quadruple amount of Bitcoin’s total coin supply
(Xie (2017), Litecoin (2017)).
4.1.2. Ripple
In 2012, the decentralized IOU (I Owe You) credit net-
work Ripple was established. Its prominence as a fast and
low-cost cryptocurrency has risen since. To comprehend this
phenomenon, Ripple’s technology and special features have
to be examined first. Considering the importance of under-
standing how Ripple differs from Bitcoin, the paper will also
draw comparisons to Bitcoin.
Ripple is at its core a distributed-consensus ledger. Ev-
ery transaction is recorded in real-time, and it automatically
updates changes in any of the users’ assets. Thus, its en-
tire transaction history can be tracked, similar to Bitcoin’s.
When changes are made to the ledger, the change is pro-
cessed by the Ripple Protocol Consensus Algorithm (RPCA).
Meanwhile the network servers will mutually agree to the
change and apply this to their ledger copy. Ripple intro-
duces a new component, the Unique Node List (UNL) (Tasca
(2015)), which is maintained by each server s and will be
queried when determining consensus. The UNL contains a
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set of servers other than s. Only their votes count when de-
termining consensus, contrary to Bitcoin’s network, which
considers every node. Hence, the UNL represents a subset
of the network, which can be “trusted” by s to not engage
in fraudulent activities, when taken collectively (Schwartz
et al. (2014)). Consequently, forks are prevented. Further,
RPCA provides the benefit of lower energy costs, since it is
not based on miners or a POW scheme.
Ripple only exchanges and transfers IOU currency within
its network. Thus, users are required to exchange their assets
in IOUs via gateways first. A gateway is a prominent wal-
let and trusted by several wallets in the system to create and
maintain a credit path correctly. Usually, they are widely con-
nected nodes and, thus, the created credit path enables the
new wallet to interact with the rest of the network. Ripple
executes transactions only if a credit path exists between the
users with enough IOU credits, whereas Bitcoin allows any
two users to exchange BTCs via a direct payment between
them. By only working with IOU currency, Ripple has a com-
petitive advantage over Bitcoin. It can provide settlement
solutions for various types of assets: Bitcoin and other cryp-
tocurrencies, fiat currencies, or commodities. In fact, it is ca-
pable of monetizing everything as long as both parties of the
transaction trust each other in terms of IOUs they are willing
to extend to each other. Therefore, Ripple can process two
transaction types. The first type is a direct XRP (Ripple) pay-
ment, for which a wallet needs to contain a certain amount of
XRP and a small transaction fee in XRP has to be paid by the
issuer. Between these payments no credit path is necessary.
The second type is a path-based settlement transaction and
is used when having other currencies than XRP. Ripple distin-
guishes three kinds of currencies – fiat, cryptographic, and
user-defined currencies - which are all treated equally. Fur-
ther, exchange wallets exist that receive a certain currency
in one of their links and exchange it for another currency
in another link. This enables cross-border payments, while
not depending on a highly-volatile underlying coin (Moreno-
Sanchez et al. (2016)).
Looking at the above benefits, Ripple’s prominence and
attraction for many financial institutes become evident.
Banks join Ripple’s global transaction network to facilitate
real-time cross-border payments without any uncertainty, no
settlement risk and complete traceability. This results in new
opportunities, enabling Ripple’s main goal: the rise of the
Internet of Value (Tasca (2015), Ripple (2017)).
4.2. Alternative Extensions
Many extensions have been proposed to solve some par-
ticular perceived problems with Bitcoin. CoinJoin, for in-
stance, addresses the issue of privacy by enhancing it through
multi-signature transactions (Tschorsch and Scheuermann
(2016)). However, this section will focus on the extension
Zerocoin, which also aims at fixing privacy issues of Bitcoin.
Zerocoin. Zerocoin is a distributed e-cash system that up-
grades the Bitcoin protocol to ensure complete anonymous
transactions without adding trusted parties (Miers et al.
(2013)). In doing so, it solves one of Bitcoin’s main weak-
nesses: anonymity.
When using Bitcoin, user privacy could only be enhanced
by employing multiple pseudonyms. Nevertheless, the de-
anonymization of individuals is still possible with informa-
tion from the public ledger. Thus, Bitcoin fails to guaran-
tee privacy, whereas Zerocoin solves this issue by applying
zero-knowledge proofs to inhibit transaction graph analyses.
Unlike Bitcoin, it does not use digital signatures for authen-
tication. Instead, it can rely on proving that the coins be-
long to a public list of valid coins (Ben-Sasson et al. (2014)).
This works as follows: Alice produces a secure commitment
scheme, i.e. the zerocoin; the zerocoin is then recorded in
the blockchain, so that all users can verify it, given its correct-
ness in sum of currency and structure; next, she broadcasts
a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof for the respective ze-
rocoin, along with a “spend” transaction; the remaining users
check transaction and proof; only if they are secure do users
allow Alice to collect the currency amount. This way, the
system ensures unlinkability by using Bitcoin as the backing
currency and zerocoins as an anonymous shadow currency
(Miers et al. (2013)). Transactions are only in the base cur-
rency. However, users can convert the base currency into and
out of zerocoins (Bonneau et al. (2015)).
Although Zerocoin provides an alternative privacy-en-
hancing approach, it lacks in performance and functional-
ity. For these reasons, daily routine transactions still have to
be carried out with Bitcoin. Performance-wise, Zerocoin is
computationally complex and requires more storage in the
ledger. Thus, the entailed costs are higher than for Bitcoin.
Functionality-wise, Zerocoin requires protocol modifications
for full-fledged anonymous payments. It uses coins of fixed
denomination, i.e. it neither supports payments of exact
values, nor transactions for change. Even though Zerocoin
ensures anonymity by unlinking a transaction from its ori-
gin, it still reveals destinations and transaction amounts
(Ben-Sasson et al. (2014)).
4.3. Altchains
Apart from the aforestated altcoins, another alternative to
Bitcoin are altchains. They implement a new structure with
Turing-complete stack language, through which the creation
of smart contracts is enabled. Via smart contracts, terms of
contracts agreed by users to applications such as sharing re-
sources can be executed (Wood (2014)). This section will
concentrate on the most promising altchain, Ethereum.
4.3.1. Ethereum
Ethereum (Ethereum) is an open-source project, built on
a blockchain-based platform, which enables developers to
create and use decentralized applications, such as smart con-
tracts. Smart contracts are “a set of promises, specified in
digital form, including protocols within which the parties per-
form on these promises” (Szabo (1996)). Being deployed on
a blockchain, they are executed as programmed without the
risk of censorship, downtime, fraud, or third-party interfer-
ence. Although no such system was established 30 years ago,
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the importance of algorithmic enforcement of contracts was
realized and it was proposed that they would have a huge im-
pact on the future of law. Hence Ethereum may be regarded
as such a crypto-law system (Wood (2014)).
Ethereum Virtual Machine. At Ethereum’s core is the Ethereum
Virtual Machine (EVM), which “forms the key part of the ex-
ecution model for an Account’s associated EVM Code” (Wood
(2014)) and is Turing-complete. By using a Turin- complete
scripting language, any user can add their own application
on top of the blockchain. These applications are also called
Dapps, which stands for decentralized applications. Indeed,
there is no single point of control or failure, since decentral-
ization enables more efficiency, scalability and resilience to
attacks. Often, Ethereum is also called a “global singleton
computer” because every node of its P2P network runs the
EVM to maintain decentralized consensus, and performs the
same instructions. The Ethereum platform itself is neutral
and featureless, allowing developers to use it for whatever
they wish. However, some applications are more suitable
than others. Dapps with automated direct interaction be-
tween peers or which facilitate coordinated group action
benefit the most from the system (The Homestead Documen-
tation Initiative).
Ethereum Accounts. Many technical components of Bitcoin
are also implemented by Ethereum. However, it also features
own extensions and innovations. In Ethereum, so-called ac-
counts define the state with state transitions, which directly
transfer value and information between accounts. Two types
of accounts exist: externally owned accounts (EOA) and con-
tract accounts. EOAs have no code, as they are controlled by
private keys. Hence, whoever holds the private key also con-
trols the EOA. Contract accounts are controlled by their con-
tract code. When the contract account receives a message,
its code gets activated. Thus, it can read and write to inter-
nal storage, send other messages, or create contracts in turn
(Buterin (2014)).
Transactions. For every transaction, users have to pay a fee
to prevent DDoS attacks. Ethereum’s native value-token is
Ether (ETH), but the fee is paid in Gas, “the fundamental
network cost unit. Paid for exclusively by Ether [. . . ], which
is converted freely to and from Gas as required.” (Wood
(2014)). In order to protect Ethereum from infinite loops or
other malicious computational tasks, each transaction needs
to limit the steps number in computation that it can use to
execute the code. The fee system intends to oblige an at-
tacker to pay in proportion to his consumption of resources
(Buterin (2014)). As with Bitcoin, Ethereum’s mining pro-
cess is based on POW. However, it works slightly differently
by using a memory-hard POW, the Ethash. Instead of only
requiring computational power, memory as well as CPU are
required, making the ideal hardware a general computer
(Wood (2014), The Homestead Documentation Initiative).
Thus, Ethereum makes the POW ASIC-resistant and, by that,
it solves Bitcoin’s centralization problem. This, in turn, gives
everyone fair access to this resource, since Ethereum can be
used wherever there is internet.
Comparison to Bitcoin. By additionally using basic program-
ming languages such as JavaScript, Ethereum is more accessi-
ble to developers than Bitcoin. Besides, Ethereum overhauls
Bitcoin in many other aspects, such as a shorter verification
time and a smaller block size (Lewis). However, most im-
portant is its allowance for smart contracts. Whereas Bitcoin
only serves as a digital currency, Ethereum also enables vari-
ous applications, from financial to e-governance. This makes
its potential so vast and a driver of innovation. Therefore,
the next section will explore Dapps and the potential of its
underlying technology, the blockchain, beyond Bitcoin.
4.3.2. Applications of Ethereum and the Potential of Blockchain
Technology
Dapps. Ethereum provides a platform for zero-trust comput-
ing smart contracts, permissions management, autonomous
trading, and many more applications. Dapps can be cat-
egorized into three types: [1] financial applications, such
as financial derivatives; [2] semi-financial; and [3] non-
monetary; e.g. online-voting. Table 1 provides an extended
overview of Dapps. However, this section will focus on the
most prominent applications on top of Ethereum (Buterin
(2014)).
The most common application of smart contracts are fi-
nancial ones. Benefits of Ethereum are the possibility to value
positions for real-time monitoring, while avoiding informa-
tion leakage and reducing risk of fraud or cyberattacks; but
also automated settlement of agreements, while executing
pre-defined tasks. Thus, smart contracts enforce a standard
set of rules to transactions and thereby optimize the deriva-
tive trade. Most importantly, it decreases time on deal clos-
ings and other transactions (Alliance (2016)).
However, not only the finance sector profits from Ethereum;
also the entertainment industry is interested in the technol-
ogy, as the recent acquisition by Spotify of the startup Medi-
achain Labs, which runs on Ethereum, proves. Spotify faces
difficulties in obtaining mechanical licenses and allocating
royalty payments (Perez). Through smart contracts, prof-
its are ensured to go back to the artist and they can share
free-trade music. They even might be able to sell their mu-
sic directly to consumers without relying on intermediaries.
Ethereum takes this idea even further and introduces the
concept of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO).
They are virtual entities which allow the majority of their
members to decide about their funds and modify their code.
Since smart contracts set terms of ownership and allocation
of funds, managers or lawyers will not be needed anymore
to run a company. Therefore, Ethereum facilitates the man-
agement of companies.
Relying more and more on the internet and online ser-
vices, such as online banking or social media, users have
no choice but to provide private information, often without
knowing what happens to their data. Smart contracts provide
decentralized identity management systems, where individ-
uals are in full control of their digital identity and reputation.
For a contract, all data is stored inside the Ethereum network
and can only be modified or removed by the particular indi-
vidual. This data could then be accessed by other contracts
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through function clauses (Buterin (2014)).
Potential of Blockchain. The third chapter explained how
blockchain functions, whereby the emphasis was on its most
common application, Bitcoin. However, there is more to
blockchain than being the basis of cryptocurrencies. All the
preceding applications are enabled by smart contracts and
they, in turn, only function due to the blockchain technol-
ogy. In fact, blockchain is evolving in many ecosystems, e.g.
Ethereum and Hyperledger. Thus, blockchain needs an inte-
gration solution, through which, for instance, a transaction
on Hyperledger could access information from Ethereum and
vice versa. The potential of blockchain is immense, consider-
ing that it enables the democratization of the internet and
other services through smart contracts. Thus, blockchain
acts as a middleman that executes legal obligations, busi-
ness deals, and data exchanges (Marvin (2017)). However,
blockchain has also the potential to solve urgent problems in
developing countries, where often there is no access to proper
land titling. Land titles could be stored on the chain, creating
more transparency. Thus, people would gain access to cred-
its as they can prove authenticity of title claims (Underwood
(2016), Dahan and Casey (2017)).
To conclude, blockchain has the potential to disrupt es-
tablished industries and drive innovation in various areas.
By providing decentralized, open and trustless platforms,
blockchain-based ecosystems like Ethereum coined the term
Web 3.0. It is an umbrella term associated with connec-
tive intelligence and “An internet where core services like
[. . . ] digital identity are decentralized, and where individ-
uals can engage in economic interactions with each other.”
(The Homestead Documentation Initiative). One of these
interactions is cloud computing, an application which allows
users to rent out spare CP and ask others to execute compu-
tations. How this application can be relevant for a specific
computing system will be addressed in the next chapter.
5. A Real Case Application of the Blockchain Technology
This chapter introduces the research project TASKLETS
and discusses how blockchain can enhance features of the
Tasklet system. Different proposals on which cryptocurrency
and its design apply best to facilitate an individualized pay-
ment system within the Tasklet system will also be given.
5.1. Tasklet Systems
TASKLETS aimed at developing a distributed computing
system. Such a system could serve as an alternative to pow-
erful specialized hardware, which is costly. Often, CP of in-
dividual users remains unused. This spare resource could
be shared within a distributed network and then utilized
by other computation-intense applications. Tasklet systems
(TS) as introduced in Schäfer et al. (2016a) build a frame-
work for such networks. They enable interoperability in het-
erogeneous computing sources and enhance the execution of
computationally intensive applications.
Tasklets are extracted subroutines of these applications,
operating multiple different processing entities. TS consist
of three different entities. While providers offer their re-
sources in form of virtual machines to resource consumers
that require additional CP, a broker oversees this process by
scheduling and matchmaking. In this process, Tasklets are
exchanged directly between the two parties in a P2P net-
work (Schäfer et al. (2016b)). To incentivize providers to
offer their computational resources to the network, a reward
system needs to be implemented, which needs to facilitate
payments between consumers and providers. In the follow-
ing, possible solutions and systems with monetization mech-
anisms similar to TS will be discussed.
5.2. Implementation of Cryptocurrencies
Since altcoins are based on a distributed ledger, they
would make the perfect remuneration tool in TS. The
blockchain technology enables decentralization and scala-
bility. By applying the technology to the system, there would
be no need for a trusted authority and no single point of
failure, even though the system is connecting many enti-
ties in a P2P network. Through blockchain, the TS could
therefore implement an appropriate monetization mecha-
nism. Because the exchange medium is not only money, but
also CP, Bitcoin-like currencies do not qualify as appropriate
remuneration systems. They are only designed as a digital
currency, when actually a transaction network that facilitates
settlement solutions for various assets is required. Therefore,
possible supporting systems could be Ripple or Ethereum.
5.2.1. Ripple as a Remuneration System
Considering that Ripple only exchanges in IOU currency
and thus enables payment solutions for different assets, it
could serve as the underlying structure for a remuneration
system in TS. Ripple allows the monetization of everything
as long as the two connected Ripple wallets of the transac-
tion trust each other in terms of IOUs they are willing to ex-
tend each other. In the TS, each of the participating devices’
ledgers could be linked by Ripple Connect through the neu-
tral Interledger Protocol (ILP) for the cross-border payment
settlements. Since ILP can work with any new system, Ripple
could serve as an user-defined remuneration system in the TS
(Ripple (2017)).
5.2.2. Ethereum and Dapps
The TS is about providing distributed computing in a P2P
network. This requires a mean for consumers to transfer re-
wards to providers in exchange for their service, which can
be done by deploying smart contracts. Ethereum runs these
smart contracts, in turn. Thus, the TS could implement the
Ethereum-based technology for their reward system to en-
able direct payments between consumers and providers.
In Buterin (2014), it was already proposed that cloud
computing could be based on Ethereum’s EVM technology.
Users could then ask their peers to carry out computations or
they can offer spare CP to the network. This idea has existed
since 2000, when Stanford researchers needed additional CP
for their data analyses and founded the distributed comput-
ing project Folding@home (Front Page (2017)).
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People could “donate” their idle CP of personal comput-
ers from their home and all over the world. With Ethereum,
this process could finally be monetized and applied to other
projects as well. By installing the technology, almost perfect
competition would exist. Ethereum as an open-source plat-
form gives providers and consumers access to perfect infor-
mation. The CP is a homogenous trade good and all partic-
ipants have a relatively small market share. Thus, no par-
ticipant has the market power to set prices. Furthermore,
entry and exit barriers are low, which can attract users to
join the network and rent out their resources within the net-
work. For this reason, computation costs can be lowered.
TS could define price setting conditions and restrictions, or
specify the pairing of consumer with provider through smart
contracts. Thus, an efficient allocation of business partners
based on their preferences and budget could be made. For in-
stance, one user is indifferent about the price, but wants the
computation to be as fast as possible. This enables a market
for distributed computing, in which anyone could participate
with their device and receive a payment automatically after
delivering the service.
This opportunity was already recognized by other devel-
opers. Two Dapps exist with similar concepts regarding cloud
computing. The first one is Golem (Golem (2016a)), a de-
centralized sharing economy of CP. Similar to TS, it connects
different devices in a P2P network and enables requestors to
rent spare CP of providers. Special is, that these resources
can be used to execute tasks requiring any amount of com-
putation time and capacity, from research to machine learn-
ing. Golem not only provides a transaction system, it also
enables developers to create and distribute software on an
app-store-like function, and use the Transaction Framework
to choose whatever remuneration model they desire in order
to make a profit (or not) from their software (Golem (2016b),
Golem (2016a)). Another Dapp, iEx.ec (iEx.ec (2017)), of-
fers Ethereum blockchain-based distributed cloud computing
as well. It works similar to Golem, but differs in some ways.
Whereas Golem aims at creating a virtual supercomputer to
attract users of High-Performance Computing, iEx.ec initially
focuses on supporting Dapps to create a virtual cloud infras-
tructure (iEx.ec (2016)).
As clearly indicated above, the most appropriate remu-
neration system for TS would be based on the Ethereum
blockchain due to its many benefits. TS would profit from
its interoperability of different devices and secure transac-
tion when exchanging value between peers. But above all,
Ethereum decentralizes the market for distributed comput-
ing, thus giving fair and complete access to everyone. Thus,
Ethereum provides the best solution for an individualized
payment system in the TS.
6. Conclusion and Outlook
This chapter forms the content-related completion of the
thesis. The paper will be closed with a conclusion and out-
look for future development and research.
6.1. Conclusion
This work studied the current state of cryptocurrencies
with emphasis on the prominent Bitcoin. Thereby, its related
concepts and underlying technology were outlined. Bitcoin
enables a decentralized network where no trusted author-
ity controls transactions and data. However, the currency
struggles with technical challenges and limitations. Various
approaches to solve these issues through alternative curren-
cies were proposed. Drawing from dispersed knowledge re-
sources, Ethereum was identified to be the most promising
to improve Bitcoin. Ethereum does not only serve as a digi-
tal currency, but also provides a decentralized platform, en-
abling the creation of smart contracts with applications in
numerous fields. The short display of these applications and
its effects, fueled by the blockchain technology, has shown its
potential to transform the internet, leading to the rise of the
Web 3.0. Not only will the digital world be affected by this
technology, but also many other aspects in life. Based on the
model of the TS, it was demonstrated how smart contracts
could be implemented in distributed computing systems to
deploy an individualized remuneration system.
Due to the limitation of research time and the high
number of different cryptocurrencies and their applications,
the thesis merely focuses on the most influential ones and
their alternative solution approaches. Since the topic of
blockchain is relatively new and unexplored, except for its
application on Bitcoin, only a fraction of its potential appli-
cations could be presented, including its implementation in
the TS. For simplicity reasons, highly technical and mathe-
matical content of the specific currencies, such as codes, are
not closer examined.
6.2. Outlook
Although Bitcoin’s framework may be limited, it will still
play an important role in the future due to its dominance in
the cryptocurrency market. In order to retain its leading posi-
tion, its limitations and vulnerabilities have to be addressed.
As suggested by Yli-Huumo et al. (2016) more research has
to be done, especially on scalability issues, to enable the per-
vasive use of blockchain technology.
With blockchain, intermediaries and centralized author-
ities for transactions are not needed anymore. However, its
impact goes far beyond Bitcoin. Thus, research should not
only focus on Bitcoin systems, but also explore blockchain’s
potential for other applications. Its facilitation of smart con-
tracts could reshape the digital world and how people will
engage with each other. It allows for the automated execu-
tion of complex tasks, while being tamper-proof. This leads
to lower costs and also trustless interaction of peers in fully
decentralized autonomous organizations.
Even though the application of smart contracts in ecosys-
tems like Ethereum is a novelty, it has shown a rapid de-
velopment already and challenges existing systems and
processes, leading to new business models and ubiquitous
Dapps. Therefore, this field has to be further explored to
pave the way for the Web 3.0.
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